FEDERAL REMOVAL PRACTICE: UTILIZATION OF
SECTION i44.i(c) BY DEFENDANT PETITIONING
ALONE WHERE ALL DEFENDANTS REMOVABLE
Universal Surety Co. v. ManhattanFire & Marine Ins.
Co.,' while reaching a correct result, has drawn attention to what may
be an undesirable gap in the federal removal statute. 2 There, the federal district court remanded a case to the state court on the ground that
the defendant, seeking to maintain removal under section 1441 (c) of
the Judicial Code, had failed to establish the required "separate and
independent claim or cause of action." 3 The court went on, however, to
THE

CASE OF

1 157 F. Supp. 6o6 (S.D.S.D. 1958).

Plaintiff, a Nebraska citizen, was surety on a

building contract, and had reconstructed a partially completed building following its
destruction by fire. Plaintiff sued in a South Dakota state court both the defendant insurance company, a citizen of New York, on a fire insurance policy taken out by the
original contractor, and the building owner, a citizen of Iowa, for breach for an agreement between the owner and the contractor, whereby the owner was to carry insurance

on the building during its construction. Both defendants refused to pay for the damage.
The defendant insurance company removed to the federal district court without being
joined in the petition by the defendant building owner.
a8 U.S.C. § 1441 (1957): "Actions removable generally.
"(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.
"(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
"(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims- or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.""
* See the precise wording of 28 U.S.C. § 144.1(c) (t95z), note 2 supra. The present
statute was aimed at eliminating some of the confusion surrounding the term "separable
controversy" with the incidental purpose of somewhat restricting federal removal juris.
diction. Historical &-Revision Notes, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (X95o). The interpretation
given the clause "separate and independent claim or cause of action" by the Supreme
Court in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (t9S), has gone far
toward restricting removal under § 144.1(c). There the court laid down as the test
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declare that even had this requirement been met, removal would still
have been improper, since the defendant, petitioning alone under section
i44i (c), had been joined originally in the state court by a codefendant
4
with a removable rather than a nonremovable claim.
Under the provisions of the earlier removal statute,5 if a "separable
for "separate and independent" whether there was a single wrong to the plaintiff
arising from an interlocked series of transactions. This test might be more accurately
stated as being that there are no separate and independent causes of action where there
is a wrongful invasion of a single right. The language comes from Baltimore S.S. Co.
v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) quoted in American Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Finn, supra at 133, as follows:
"Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but one actionable
wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due to one or
the other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination of some
or all of them. In either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a
single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the
acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex."
It is interesting to note that the language in the Phillips case meant only that different allegations of negligence made against one defendant constituted only one cause of
action. There can be no doubt that the Finn case extends the quoted language to
cover actions against two defendants severally. "The single wrong for which relief
is sought is the failure to pay compensation for the loss of the property. Liability lay
among the three parties, but it was uncertain which was responsible2
American Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Finn, supra at 14. And in Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 184
F.zd 537 (3rd Cir. i95o) no "separate and independent claim" was found because
there was only a "single economic injury."
In light of the statutory history and the holding in the Finn case, the determination
in the instant decision that there was no "separate and independent claim or cause of
action" seems dearly correct. As to the restrictive effect of the Finn test see 40 CALIF.
L. REV. 317 (1952); 52 CoLUM. L. REV. ioz (1952) ; 46 ILL. L. REV. 335 (195.);
49 MICH. L. RE'V. 1236 (i95t). And for a caustic criticism of the Finn decision and

its probable effect see Keefe, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial
Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569 (z9S2).
A case decidedly similar on the facts to the instant case, but in which "separate and
indepndent' causes of action were found is Commander-Larabee Milling Co. v. JonesHettelsater Constr. Co., 88 F. Supp. 476 (D.C. Mo. x95o), decided prior to the Finn
case.
' 157

F. Supp. at 6to. See also the language of

28

U.S.C. §

(x952), note

1441(c)

z jupra.

a 36 Star. 1094 (i9±i), as amended

29

U.S.C. § 71 (1940).

The third sentence

of the former statute provided: "And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy" which is-wholly between citizens of different States, and which
can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants
actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of
the United States for the proper district."
The evolution of § 1441(c) of the 194 .fievision from former § 71 of the Judicial
Code, has been the subject of much legal writing. See American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Finn, 34t U.S. 6 (595o), noted in 40 CAL.!.

L. RET. 317 (%952);

s
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controversy" were removable, the entire case could be removed. It
seems apparent from a reading of newer section i44i (c) that in revising
the old statute, the intention had been to preserve this feature of removal
practice.7 However, the insertion of the limitational words, "whenever
... joined with one or more non-removable claims or causes of action"
would seem specifically to preclude removal under section i441 (c) by a
party or parties defendant to a removable claim when such claim is
REV. 1 (1952) ; 46 ILL. L. REV. 335 (951) i 49 MICH. L. REV. 1236 (1951) ; 25
So. CAL. L. REV. 379 (1952); Annot., x9 A.L.R.2d 748 (1951); Lewin, The Federal
Courts' Hospitable Back Door--Removal of Separate and Independent Non-Federal
Causes of Action, 66 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1953)5 Comment, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 261
(1947)
Note, 33 MINN. L. REV. 738 (1949). The "separable controversy" test
of
former § 71 gave rise to much litigation and confusion as to what constituted such a
"separable controversy." Probably the most authoritative view was that adopted by Professor Moore. The essence of his position is that a "separable controversy" exists only
where liability is several or alternative among the defendants, such as would allow a
permissive joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but not where joint
liability is alleged, in which case the defendants would be indispensable parties. MOORE,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE, 242-48 (949).

'City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 277 U.S. 54 (z928) reversing 2o F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1927) ; Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880) ; Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 15o F.zd 227 (sth Cir. 1945). But that partial remand
might be made where the controversy was "separate" rather than "separable," see Curacao
Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 4o F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). But cf., Eber
Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
Prior to 1866 there was no removal without complete diversity regardless of whether
or not the suit contained separate or separable controversies or causes of action. From
1866 to 1875 the suit was split into two parts where such a separable controversy existed,
one part left in the state court and the other removed to the federal court. The disadvantages of having a part of the suit in a state court and part in a federal court 'caused
a change in 1875 to the effect that the entire suit vas removed to the federal court if
a separable controversy existed which could be removed.' Barney v. Latham, supra. On
September x, 1948, § 1441(c) became effective changing the standard froni "separable
controversy' to "separate and -independent claim or cause or action" -and also providing
for discretionary remand of -the nonremovable separate causes of action. For a summary of the previous acts and their -historic backgiound see' Texas Employers Ind. As'n
v. Felt, supra.
However,'the last claause bf §"1441 (c). e4rissly' ptovides for discretionary remand
of nonremovable matter. See note 2 supra. This proyision has been severely critieited:
Keefe, Venue and Removal Jokkrs: in the New .Federql Jshdicial Code,' 8 V.:.L. "REv.
569, 61x (1952);-Note, 33 CONELL'L.Q. .6i;'270(194Y)."
z8 U.S.C
144r(c) (195%) 'has' beefitconiirued -as "re4tiring 'all defendknts woi
the separate 'cause of action to joir in petiti'6ning; thut. varying frbm "the language, "ohi"
or more defendnts actually- interested"':employed • in"the fbrtner provisidn: "Cdloradd
ex rel. Land Acquisition Comm'n v. American' Mach'ine-& Fouhdry'Cd'. "I43'F; Supp4
703 (D.C."CIo.1i;6) ;Board of Diretfori of Ci'.vford, County Lee1Dlst'. v. Wlhiteside, 87 "F..Supp."6. (W.D.Ark- 1949)."
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joined only with another removable claim, as in the present case.9 Of
course, section 1441(a) provides an avenue for removal of such claims
by the "defendant or defendants," under which the courts have required
joinder of all defendants in the removal petition,"0 but there is no comparable provision in section I44I(c). The result, if I44I(c) be read
as an exception to 1441 (a) with regard to the requirements of unanimity
among the defendants, is anomalous. A claim which originally would
not lie within federal jurisdiction may be removed from a state to a
federal forum, irrespective of the wishes of the defendant to that claim;"
while a claim which could have been brought in the federal courts in
the first instance cannot be removed from a state court by a single defendant, but requires the joinder of all other removable defendants in
the petition for removal, at least where no nonremovable claim is
present.
Assuming, for purposes of illustration, that a separate and independent claim did exist in the Universal Surety Co. case, three views of the
removal statute, especially section I44I(c), seem possible.
First, it may well be that the result which the court predicted by
way of obiter dictum would be a desirable one. Since both defendants
might have removed under section 141(a) by joining in the removal
petition, the case would differ from that in which a defendant lacking
diversity is made a party, often for the very purpose of preventing removal. 12 It is felt that the latter situation is what 141(c) was specifically designed to cover. Yet, in the instant situation had either de. This would seem to follow by negative implication or perhaps from the maxim
exprersio unius exclusio alterius. That is, Congress by providing for removal where

joined with a nonremovable claim, implies that the section should not apply where
joined solely with a removable claim.
'°Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry, v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245 (19oo); Wright v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 98 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Gratz v. Murchison, 13o F. Supp. 709
(D.C. Del. 1ss); Barnes v. Parker, '26 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 954); Warner V..
Dunmyer, ios F. SuPl. 757 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Smith v. Waldemar, 8s F. Sup.. 36
(E.D..Tenn. 199).

"1 This would be the case where a non-resident defendant removed on the basis of

§

1441(c) taking with him a resident .defendant who was not diverse as to.the plaintiff.

There s'some controversy as-to the nnstiiutionality of this provision. That the current,
rerhoval'staiute exceedsthe constitutional grant of jurisdiction see Lewin, The Federal.
Courts "I'osiitableBak boor--Rem'ov tl of Separate and Iidependent No,-Fed ri,
Chase5' of A4ion," 66 HARI. L. REV. "423 (1953); but'see MOORE, COMNIiENTARY O,N
THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 253 (1949)..
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fendant been sued alone, he would then have had the choice of defending
in the state court or removing to the federal court. Allowing the codefendant with a removable claim to keep the entire case in the state
court by refusing to join in the petition for removal 8 would harmonize
with the current trend to contract removal jurisdiction, 14 and this result
may not seem unjust when it is considered that two of the parties prevail
in their choice of forum, defeating the efforts of the third toward effecting removal. The argument loses much of its merit, however, if a
situation is imagined wherein there are a large number of defendants,
each with a removable claim, only one of whom desires to remain in the
state court. In that event, sheer weight of numbers would seem to
dictate a contrary result. Furthermore, it would seem undesirable to
leave a defendant's removal chances under the "separate and independent claim" provisions of section 144-1 (c) to the vagaries of state joinder
procedures, some of which, by virtue of their liberal terms, would permit a plaintiff to join a removable defendant who he knew in advance
would not consent to removal.
Another possible interpretation, apparently discarded by the court
in the present case, would have allowed removal, assuming, again,
that a separate and independent cause of action existed. This construction would require reading "whenever ... is joined.. ." as meaning
"even if ... joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims
or causes of action."' 5 Reading the statute in this manner, it could
reasonably be inferred that the provision contained the implication that
a removable defendant could, on his own petition, remove the claim in
all cases where he was joined only with another removable defendant,
and that the language concerning nonremovable claims was inserted to
insure that similar procedure could be followed where a nonremovable
party happened to be involved. Such an interpretation requires holding
that section x441i(c) alone governs those -ases in which separate and
independent claims or causes of action are joined, with the necessary ima See note 8 supra.
" American Fire-& Casualty Co. v. Finn, 347 U.S. 6 (195o); South Carolina Elec. &
Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.S.D. x953); Babb v. Paul Revere Life
Ins. Co., ioa. F. Supp. z4-7 (W.D.S.C. xg95); Cudahy v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Mo. 195p); i Bmto & HOLZOFFp, Fzgw.. PIAcrmcm ANo
PztocEnu1X§" os (SUpp. 1957).
"See the precise wording of § x441(c),. note z tupra. The court in the present
caw used the language "whether joined" in considering this argument, t57 F. Supp.
at 6to, but it is felt that this is approximated by the "even if" language employe4

here.
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plication that subsections (a) and (b) of section I44.I have no bearing on
such situations.
A final possibility, and perhaps the most accurate interpretation, is
that the problem instantly posed is one which Congress did not contemplate. It seems plausible to believe that Congress, in fact, did not
advert to the possibility that removal of two removable joined causes
of action would be attempted under section 1441 (c), since normally one
would expect the defendants in such a case to be in agreement on the
removal issue and to remove, if at all, under section i44i(a). Significantly, neither the revisors of the statute nor the leading authorities
on procedure have mentioned the situation under discussion.""
Thus, it is submitted that while the dictum in Universal Surety Co.
v. ManhattanFire & Marine Ins. Co. may be in conformity both with
accepted rules of construction and with the trend of recent cases toward
contracting removal jurisdiction, Congress should act to clarify the
anomaly lurking in section i441, with respect to what parties must be
joined in petitioning for removal and what circumstances bring a case
within the scope of section 144i (c).
" There is no intimation that such a view was contemplated either in the revisor's
notes appended to the statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1950), unofficially in publications
by the men active in the preparation of the revision, Barron, The Judicial Code; z948
Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439 (1949) 5 Maris, An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial
Code: Enactment by 8oth Congress a Notable Gain, 34 A.B.A.J. 863 (1948), nor
in the pertinent sections of other authoritative works, MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 215-88 (1949)5
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 101-09 (1.950).
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One view is expressed that the change in language from "wholly between citizens
of different states" to "is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or

causes of action" was designed primarily to insure the elimination of any discrimination
against citizens of the territories and the District of Columbia, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 261,

271 (1947).

